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1. Introduction 
Consumer policy typically distinguishes between marketing practices that mislead and those 
that harmlessly exaggerate to capture attention. For instance, the United States Federal Trade 
Commission “generally will not pursue cases involving obviously exaggerated or puffing 
representations, i.e., those that the ordinary consumers do not take seriously” (FTC, 1984). 
This concept of harmless “puffery” originated in common law back in Victorian times. 
However, it can be difficult to distinguish between puffery and claims that mislead 
consumers and hence cause harm. The present study demonstrates how applied behavioural 
economics can generate relevant empirical evidence for a regulator. The experimental study 
focused on the broadband market and was undertaken in collaboration with the Commission 
for Communications Regulation (ComReg) in Ireland.  
Consider two consumers shopping for a broadband package. Jim knows little about 
broadband speeds but thinks the Lightning Fast, Next-Generation package for €60 per month 
must offer better service than the Superfast package at €40. By contrast, Rosie recognises that 
both packages offer maximum speeds up to 100Mbs, so she simply chooses the cheaper one. 
The primary aim of this study was to determine whether broadband consumers respond like 
Jim or like Rosie to such pseudo-technical claims. In other words, do consumers treat them as 
puffery or not?   
The work was motivated by ComReg’s concerns about how broadband speed is marketed. 
One possibility is that broadband customers may be particularly susceptible to puffery given 
the technical nature of the product. Successive technologies necessarily introduce consumers 
to new words and concepts (“superhighway”, “Wi-Fi”, “fibre”). This may make it easier to 
design effective yet empty marketing claims; to those in the know they look like puffery, but 
to the unwary they appear to be an attribute.  
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The experiment was conducted online and sought to reveal how the influence of pseudo-
technical claims found in Ireland’s broadband market compare with the effect of meaningful 
technical labels (speed in megabits per second; “Mbs”) and marketing claims that clearly 
constitute puffery (“Best Deal”, “Great Value”). In addition to this diagnostic test, the 
experiment tested a potential policy remedy. Decisions were recorded before and after 
reading information designed to improve understanding of broadband speed and how it is 
advertised.  
Our findings suggest that a significant minority of consumers will pay more for a product 
advertised with an empty, pseudo-technical claim. One-in-five participants opted for 
broadband advertised as “TurboFast” or “NextGeneration” despite another provider offering 
the same speed at a lower price – they chose a dominated product. However, both pseudo-
technical claims and standard marketing puffery had similar effects on consumers seeking 
fast broadband. Thus, given this general susceptibility to puffery, regulation of pseudo-
technical language may impose a regulatory burden without alleviating the risk of consumer 
detriment. Importantly, following the information intervention, individuals who were initially 
susceptible to puffery became less likely to choose a dominated provider and more likely to 
choose cheaper broadband packages. More broadly, the results demonstrate how the methods 
of behavioural economics can be used to diagnose consumer policy problems and pre-test 
remedies. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Previous Research 
Puffery is distinct from misleading advertising in two aspects: whether consumers believe 
claims and whether they factor them into choices (e.g. Cowley, 2006; Colaizzi, Crook, 
Wheeler & Sachs, 2017). In the UK, puffery is defined as obvious exaggerations that “the 
average consumer… is unlikely to take literally”; in Australia, to exaggerated claims “that no 
one could possibly treat seriously or find misleading” (ASA, 2008; ACCC, 2019). These 
definitions arguably confound two empirical issues: whether consumers believe a claim and 
whether it influences their choices.  
A reasonable consumer may take a hyperbolic claim seriously if it seems to convey technical 
information and the consumer lacks sufficient knowledge (e.g. Xu & Wyer, 2000). Yet even 
where the claim is not believable, a reasonable person may act on it. People frequently make 
inferences beyond stated information and such inferences need not follow logically from 
premises. People often infer “pragmatic implications” when processing information, for 
example, inferring that the statement “the absent-minded professor didn’t have his car keys” 
implies that the professor lost or forgot his keys (Harris & Monaco, 1978, p. 3). Such 
pragmatic implications may be inferred from puffery. Consumers may assume that a 
highlighted attribute is unique or exceptional even if they do not take the associated claim 
literally, treating it as a signal of superiority over other products (Burke, Milberg & Moe, 
1997; Chakraborty & Harbaugh, 2014). Thus, advertising a “TurboFast” broadband package 
may lead some consumers to infer that the product is faster than its competitors, even if they 
know the term to be technically meaningless.  
Establishing whether claims are taken literally or influence choices can be difficult, 
particularly when the materiality of the influence is important for law (Richards & Preston, 
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1992). Surveys show that consumers can believe certain types of puffery and that it can 
impact product evaluations (Olshavsky & Miller, 1972; Rotfield & Rotzoll, 1980; Russo, 
Metcalf & Stephens, 1981; Simonson & Holbrook, 1993; Toncor & Fetscherin, 2012), but 
experimental research measuring the impact of puffery is rare.  
2.2. Experimental Motivation 
Our aim was to design an experimental test to generate evidence for policy in two ways. First, 
we investigated whether pseudo-technical claims affect broadband choices by testing 
willingness to pay more for an equivalent speed when the expensive option carried a pseudo-
technical claim (“Lightning Fast”, “Next Generation”). The actual speed was specified, so no 
valid inference could be made that the product carrying the claim was in fact faster. In 
addition, because products with more attributes are more cognitively demanding to assess 
(e.g., Sela & Berger, 2012), and uncertainty may increase the likelihood that consumers treat 
an empty claim as a signal of quality, the test also included bundled broadband products (e.g., 
with TV and phone included). Second, we compared willingness to choose a more expensive 
package when it was advertised with a pseudo-technical claim, with standard puffery, or with 
no puffery at all. This manipulation matters for evidence-based policy, since there is little 
point toughening the regulatory stance on pseudo-technical claims if standard puffery has the 
same effect.    
Similarly, from an evidence-based policy perspective, in addition to diagnosing the impact of 
pseudo-technical claims, it is helpful to test remedies designed to improve decisions, perhaps 
especially those that impose minimal regulatory burden. A subsequent stage of the 
experiment therefore investigated whether a short information page could alleviate the risk of 
consumers being misled. Specifically, we tested two types of information: (1) information on 
which descriptions of broadband speed are meaningful and which are meaningless; (2) 
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information on the speed requirements of different internet activities. The first was 
straightforwardly based on evidence that training can reduce susceptibility to misleading 
advertising (Harris, 1977; Gaeth & Heath, 1987), the second on evidence that product 
knowledge can protect consumers from being misled by puffery (Xu & Wyer, 2004). 
In summary, our research questions were: 
(1a) Do pseudo-technical claims cause consumers to make objectively poor broadband 
choices?  
(1b) Do pseudo-technical claims cause consumers to make more poor choices when 
evaluating bundled compared to standalone broadband products? 
(2) Does the presence of pseudo-technical puffery increase the likelihood that consumers 
opt for faster more expensive broadband packages?  
(3) Can any risks identified in questions (1) and (2) be alleviated through consumer 
advice?   
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3. Method 
The study was conducted in line with institutional policy for ethical conduct of research. 
Elements of the experiment, including participant exclusion criteria, were pre-registered (see 
Munafò et al., 2017). The pre-registration, including experimental code and data, is available 
at https://osf.io/9qmjn/.  
 
3.1 Participants 
Four-hundred consumers were recruited by a market research agency to be broadly 
representative of the adult population in Ireland. Of these, 32 indicated that they were not 
broadband consumers and 2 failed a quality control question. These participants were 
removed from all analyses, leaving a sample of 367 aged 18 to 70 years (M = 42.27, SD = 
13.43), comprised of 185 women and 182 men, 194 with a third-level degree and 211 in 
fulltime employment. Consistent with national estimates, the urban-rural split was 70:30. 
Participants received a link to the experiment on the online account with the agency. They 
received a minimum of €9 for taking part (some received €15, depending on performance on 
an unrelated task), deposited into their panel account. Each participant was also entered at 
least once into a draw for one of ten €100 shopping vouchers. 
 
3.2 Design, Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was programmed and hosted on Gorilla (https://gorilla.sc; Anwyl-Irvine, 
Massonnié, Flitton, Kirkham & Evershed, 2019). Materials were based on online offerings in 
the market, adhered to regulations and were approved by ComReg. To mimic how consumers 
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make broadband decisions, participants undertook the experiment online (see Horton, Rand 
& Zeckhauser, 2011). It proceeded over five stages matched to the research questions. 
  
Stage 1: 
(1a) Do pseudo-technical claims cause consumers to make objectively poor 
broadband choices? 
(1b) Do pseudo-technical claims cause consumers to make more poor choices when 
evaluating bundled compared to standalone broadband products? 
In Stage 1, there were four advertisements from fictional providers. To account for different 
internet-use requirements, the materials were designed such that two pairs offered low 
download speed (24Mbs) and two offered higher download speed (100Mbs). Within these 
pairings, the providers varied according to a 2 (claim: pseudo-technical, standard puffery) x 2 
(bundling: bundled, unbundled) design, with the claim variable manipulated within-subjects 
and the bundling variable manipulated between (see Charness, Gneezy & Kuhn, 2012). That 
is, within each pair, one was advertised with a pseudo-technical claim, the other with 
standard marketing puffery (Figure 1), and participants were randomly assigned to choose 
either standalone broadband (n = 193) or a broadband, TV and phone bundle (n = 174). 
Crucially, the pseudo-technical claim was always associated with a higher price than the 
standard one at that speed, such that the pseudo-technical provider was dominated. The four 
providers were randomised across conditions. Participants were informed that there were no 
right or wrong answers – we were interested simply in their preference. The task was to 
choose as they would in real life. 
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Figure 1. Example broadband provider choice screen in the unbundled condition. 
 
Stage 2: 
(2) Does the presence of pseudo-technical puffery increase the likelihood that consumers 
opt for faster more expensive broadband packages?  
 
After participants chose a provider, Stage 2 presented four packages in ascending order of 
price and maximum download speed (Figure 2). There was one between-groups 
manipulation: participants were randomly assigned to see the fastest, most expensive package 
advertised with a pseudo-technical label (n = 130), a standard marketing label (n = 126) or no 
label (n = 111). Their task was again to choose as they would in real life.  
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Figure 2. Example broadband packages for participants in the pseudo-technical condition. 
 
Stages 3, 4 and 5: 
(3) Can any risks identified in questions (1) and (2) be alleviated through consumer 
 advice? 
 
In Stage 3, participants were randomly assigned to read one of three information pages: 
information that explained how broadband speeds are advertised (hereafter “Ads”; n = 130), 
the same information plus a section on speed requirements of different internet activities 
(“Ads + Speed”; n = 113) or information on the history of broadband (“Control”; n = 124). 
Participants could not proceed past this stage until at least 30 seconds had elapsed 
(determined through pilot testing). Stages 4 and 5 repeated Stages 1 and 2 respectively. The 
providers and packages seen before and after the intervention were different and determined 
randomly. Each participant remained in the same between-groups condition (i.e., if they 
chose bundles in Stage 1, they chose bundles in Stage 4 too, and similarly for the label 
manipulation in Stages 2 and 5). 
11 
 
Following the experiment participants completed an unrelated experiment on premium rate 
services. The session concluded with questions about background characteristics and three 
multiple choice questions that probed understanding of broadband speed advertising. For 
example, one question asked:  
 Which of the following packages is most likely to offer the fastest speed? 
• Superfast broadband 
• Lightning Speed broadband 
• Ultrafast broadband 
• Next Generation broadband 
 
These questions served as a manipulation check for the information stage. Participants in the 
Ads and Ads + Speed conditions should, for example, know that the correct answer is 
Ultrafast (300Mbs and above). We hypothesised that participants in the Ads and Ads + Speed 
conditions would perform better than those in the control condition.  
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4. Results 
We consider each research question in turn as they correspond to each stage of the 
experiment. We report tests of pre-registered, directional hypotheses as one-tailed and all 
other tests as two-tailed.  
(1a) Do pseudo-technical claims cause consumers to make objectively poor broadband 
choices? 
In the first stage, 74% of participants opted for one of the two fast broadband providers, while 
the remaining 26% chose one of the cheaper but slower providers. A significant minority 
opted for a dominated product: 21% chose a provider advertised with a pseudo-technical 
claim rather than a cheaper alternative offering the same speed. A test of proportion indicated 
no difference between those who showed a preference for fast broadband and those who 
preferred slower broadband, Z = 1.13, p = .260, two-tailed (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants choosing the dominated provider at each speed. Error bars are the standard 
error of the proportion.  
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 (1b) Do pseudo-technical claims cause consumers to make more poor choices when 
evaluating bundled compared to standalone broadband products? 
There was no evidence that participants choosing bundled broadband were more likely to 
choose a dominated product than those choosing standalone broadband, Z = 0.90, p = .816, 
one-tailed (Figure 3). Logistic regression models4 for choosing a dominated provider are 
reported in Table 1. Model 1 confirms the above results and Model 2 shows that they hold 
when controls are added for being the bill-payer, gender, age, having a university degree, 
working fulltime and living in an urban area5.   
 
Table 1 Logistic Regressions Predicting Choice of Dominated Providers in Stage 1 
 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
                                                             
4 The results are the same if multinomial models are run predicting choice of the four providers.  
5 We had planned to include a measure of the participant’s current broadband speed, but 80% of the sample 
reported not knowing their own maximum broadband speed. Of the 20% who reported knowing, some gave 
implausible speeds (e.g. 15,000 Mbs) and so this data was not useable for analysis. 
  (1)  (2)  
Bundled (Ref: Unbundled) -0.22 
(0.26) 
-0.18 
(0.26) 
Chose Slow (Ref: Fast) 0.30 
(0.28) 
0.26 
(0.29) 
Bill-payer (Ref: Not) 
 
-0.10 
(0.30) 
Male (Ref: Female) 
 
-0.13 
(0.27) 
Over 40 (Ref: ⩽40) 
 
0.29 
(0.28) 
Degree (Ref: No Degree)  -0.03 
(0.27) 
Fulltime (Ref: Not Fulltime)  -0.31 
(0.28) 
Urban (Ref: Rural)  -0.14 
(0.28) 
Constant -1.31*** 
(0.19) 
-1.05* 
(0.47) 
Obs. 367 367 
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(2) Does the presence of pseudo-technical puffery increase the likelihood that consumers opt 
for faster more expensive broadband packages?  
The packages chosen in each condition in Stage 2 are presented in Figure 4. In Table 2, we 
report ordered logistic models of package choice. Model 3 implies that participants were 
more likely to choose a faster package when the fastest one carried a standard marketing label 
than when there was no label present, p = .021, two-tailed, but there is no evidence that they 
were influenced by the pseudo-technical label.  
 
 
Figure 4. Broadband package speeds chosen by participants. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
However, this model fails a Brant test of the proportional odds assumption. Generalised 
ordered logistic models reveal a similar qualitative pattern, but the failure of this assumption 
and the dispersion of the distributions in Figure 4 suggest that different participants may have 
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responded to the labels in different ways. The multi-stage experimental design allows us to 
examine whether labels had different effects depending on the initial preference for more 
expensive, high-speed or for cheaper, low-speed broadband. Model 4 includes an interaction 
between the speed chosen in Stage 1 and the label in Stage 2. Although not initially 
hypothesised, the interaction between the Stage 1 choice and the pseudo-technical label is 
significant at the 1% level, while the interaction with the standard label is also marginally 
significant. Once these interactions are included in the specification the models pass the 
proportional odds test. The pattern of interactions suggests that, relative to the control group, 
the standard label increased the price and speed chosen by participants who opted for faster 
broadband in Stage 1, but had little impact on those who opted for slower broadband in Stage 
1. By contrast, the pseudo-technical label had an impact in both directions: those who initially 
opted for faster broadband were pulled towards faster more expensive packages and those 
who initially opted for slower broadband were repelled towards slower cheaper ones. Tests 
for equality of coefficients reveal no difference between the two label types for participants 
who opted for faster speeds in Stage 1, χ2 (1, N = 367) = 1.82, p = .178, two-tailed, but the 
pseudo-technical label had a significantly stronger repellent effect for participants who opted 
for slower speeds, χ2 (1, N = 367) = 4.65, p = .031, two-tailed. The results are the same when 
socio-demographic controls are added in Model 5. These also reveal that urban participants 
favoured faster packages.  
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Table 2. Ordered Logit Models of Package Choice in Stage 2 
  (3) ‡  (4) 
 
(5) 
Label (Ref: Control)    
    Standard  0.49* 
(0.23) 
0.76** 
(0.28) 
0.80** 
(0.28) 
    Pseudo-technical 0.13 
(0.23) 
0.47* 
(0.27) 
0.58* 
(0.28) 
Chose Slow S1 (Ref: Chose Fast)  -1.19** 
(0.39) 
-1.20** 
(0.39) 
Label * Chose Slow    
    Standard – Chose Slow 
 
-0.97† 
(0.55) 
-0.89† 
(0.55) 
    Pseudo-technical – Chose Slow 
 
-1.72** 
(0.55) 
-1.72** 
(0.56) 
Bill-payer (Ref: Not) 
 
 -0.16 
(0.23) 
Male (Ref: Female)   -0.34† 
(0.20) 
Over 40 (Ref: ⩽40)   0.17 
(0.21) 
Degree (Ref: No Degree)   0.01 
(0.21) 
Fulltime (Ref: Not Fulltime)   0.12 
(0.21) 
Urban (Ref: Rural)   0.55** 
(0.21) 
Obs. 367 367 367 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
‡This model fails the Brant test for proportional odds (p < .05). Running generalised ordered logits does not qualitatively 
affect the results. 
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(3) Can any risks identified in questions (1) and (2) be alleviated through consumer advice? 
In Stage 4, after reading the information, participants again chose a provider from four 
options. There was no evidence for a decrease in the number of participants choosing a 
dominated provider in any conditions, as evidenced from tests of the proportion of 
participants choosing the dominated provider before and after the information stage, within 
each condition: ZControl = 0.78, p = .213, one-tailed; ZAds = 0.79, p = .214, one-tailed; ZAds+Speed 
= 0.86, p = .194, one-tailed. Table 3 reports logistic regressions for choosing a dominated 
provider in Stage 4, controlling for whether the participant chose a dominated provider in 
Stage 1 and their speed preference. Model 6 shows no evidence for an effect of bundling or 
intervention, ps > .662. Participants with lower speed preferences were more likely to choose 
a dominated provider, p = .007, two-tailed, as were those who chose a dominated provider in 
Stage 1, p = .003, two-tailed.  
The information interventions were tailored to consumers who might be susceptible to 
pseudo-technical claims. Model 7 tests for an interaction between choosing a dominated 
provider in Stage 1 and the intervention. The main effect shows that those who chose a 
dominated provider in Stage 1 were more likely to do so again, p = .027, two-tailed, but 
among this group the likelihood was lower for those in the Ads + Speed condition (13.04%) 
than those in the control condition (33.33%), p = .045, one-tailed, and in the Ads condition 
(37.04%), χ2 (1, N = 243) = 4.75, p = .029, two-tailed. The results are the same when socio-
demographic controls are added (Model 8).  
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Table 3 Logistic Regressions Predicting Choice of Dominated Providers in Stage 4 
  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Bundled (Ref: Unbundled) -0.19 
(0.29) 
-0.24 
(0.29) 
-0.24 
(0.29) 
Intervention (Ref: Control)    
     Ads -0.01 
(0.34) 
-0.15 
(0.43) 
-0.12 
(0.44) 
     Ads + Speed -0.16 
(0.36) 
0.21 
(0.42) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
Chose Dominated S1 (Ref: Did Not) 0.91** 
(0.31) 
1.13* 
(0.51) 
1.06* 
(0.52) 
Intervention * Chose Dominated    
    Dominated – Ads  0.42 
(0.72) 
0.55 
(0.74) 
    Dominated – Ads + Speed  -1.45* 
(0.86) 
-1.23† 
(0.87) 
Chose Slow (Ref: Fast) 0.84** 
(0.21) 
0.84** 
(0.31) 
0.93** 
(0.32) 
Bill-payer (Ref: Not) 
 
 -0.25 
(0.33) 
Male (Ref: Female) 
 
 0.04 
(0.30) 
Over 40 (Ref: ⩽40) 
 
 0.19 
(0.32) 
Degree (Ref: No Degree)   -0.13 
(0.31) 
Fulltime (Ref: Not Fulltime)   0.37 
(0.33) 
Urban (Ref: Rural)   0.29 
(0.33) 
Constant -1.98*** 
(0.34) 
-1.98** 
(0.34) 
-2.31*** 
(0.61) 
Obs. 367 367 367 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Importantly, participants in both advice conditions displayed a better understanding of how 
broadband speeds are advertised at the end of the experiment. A one-way ANOVA shows a 
strong overall effect of intervention read in Stage 3 on performance in the final multiple 
19 
 
 
choice questions, F (1, 366) = 5.80, p = .003, d = 0.37. There was no difference between 
participants who read either of the interventions (MAds = 1.53, SDAds = 0.97; MAds+Speed = 1.45, 
SDAds+Speed = 0.76), p = .483, but both groups performed better than participants in the control 
groups (M = 1.19, SD = 0.76), ps < .001, one-tailed. 
When it came to choosing a broadband package for the second time, 19% (n = 70) changed 
their choice from Stage 2. Tests of proportions show that more participants in the advice 
conditions (Ads: 21%; Ads + Speed: 24%) than in the control condition (13%) changed their 
choice: ZAds = 1.67, p = .047, one-tailed; ZAds+Speed = 2.15, p = .016, one-tailed. There was no 
difference between the two advice conditions: Z = 0.58, p = .559, two-tailed.  
 
Table 4. Interaction Models for Each Intervention, Predicting Package Choice in Stage 4. 
 Whole sample Control Ads Ads + Speed 
 Stage 2 Stage 2 Stage 5 Stage 2 Stage 5 Stage 2 Stage 5 
Slow * Standard -.97† 
(.55) 
.70 
(.92) 
.46 
(.92) 
-2.64** 
(1.01) 
-1.28 
(.98) 
-.56 
(1.03) 
.19 
(.98) 
Slow * Pseudo-tech -1.72** 
(.52) 
-.68 
(1.07) 
-1.06 
(1.08) 
-2.24* 
(.91) 
-1.94* 
(.90) 
-3.73** 
(1.38) 
-.88 
(.98) 
Obs. 367 124 130 113 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
More fine-grained analysis of whether there were systematic directional effects in changes of 
package is made problematic by small cell sizes, given the unexpected interaction between 
label and speed preference. The sample is small for assessing a three-way interaction between 
initial speed preference, label and intervention group. Furthermore, closer analysis revealed 
misfortune in the randomisation: the original interaction between speed preference and label 
in Stages 1 and 2 was significantly smaller in the control group. Given this, Table 4 presents 
separate models for each intervention group, showing the interactions between speed 
preference in Stage 1 and label for choices of package before (Stage 2) and after (Stage 5) the 
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intervention. All interaction coefficients are reduced for the two advice groups (losing 
statistical significance in two cases) but not for the control group, consistent with the advice 
having reduced the impact of the labels. Given the sample and randomisation issues, 
however, this evidence should probably be regarded as suggestive but weak.  
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5. Discussion 
 
The experiment showed that, prior to reading information about broadband speeds and how 
they are advertised, one-in-five broadband consumers chose a provider advertised with a 
pseudo-technical claim over a cheaper provider offering the same speed. When choosing a 
package, pseudo-technical claims had a polarising effect on consumers: those looking for fast 
broadband chose a faster, more expensive package than they otherwise would have, whereas 
those wanting slow broadband chose a slower, cheaper one. Standard puffery affected only 
those consumers seeking fast broadband. The effect on consumers seeking fast broadband is 
perhaps more problematic from a consumer welfare perspective, since it leads to consumers 
paying more than they otherwise would. The commonality of this effect to both types of 
claims has policy implications: if pseudo-technical claims cause a sizeable minority of 
consumers to choose dominated providers, but when all else is equal they have the same 
effect as standard puffery, there may be little benefit of regulations limiting the use of 
pseudo-technical marketing of broadband speed.  
More encouragingly, the experiment showed that informing consumers about broadband 
speeds and how they are advertised helped those consumers who were susceptible to pseudo-
technical claims to avoid choosing a dominated provider. Moreover, consumers who read this 
information were also more likely to change their package choice. Although we are cautious 
about the directional analysis, the evidence is at least suggestive that the change mitigated the 
original effect of the label. Crucially, consumers who read the advice displayed better 
understanding of how broadband speeds are advertised relative to consumers who read the 
control information. The results therefore show a change in consumer choices through the use 
of a relatively soft intervention, especially among those originally susceptible to being 
misled.  
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The online experiment allowed systematic investigation of how pseudo-technical claims 
affect consumer choices, but some caveats are required. Although we designed our materials 
in collaboration with the national regulator and designed the stages to mimic real consumer 
choices, it could be argued that in real (as opposed to hypothetical) decisions consumers 
would be incentivised to be more careful in relation to unreliable marketing claims. However, 
the significant changes in choices among only those who read the information suggests that 
participants who initially chose the more expensive packages were engaged with the task, 
trying to make a good decision and learned from what they read. Moreover, other effects, 
such as urban participants seeking higher broadband speeds, are consistent with what we 
would expected to see in the market.  
As well as providing evidence specific to pseudo-technical marketing of broadband speed, 
this study demonstrates how collaboration between researchers and policymakers can lead to 
more behaviourally informed policy-making. In this case, the evidence confirmed that there 
was a consumer protection issue, but arguably did not lend support to a tough regulatory line 
on permissible product descriptions, instead suggesting that softer, information-based 
interventions may suffice. The study therefore shows how applying the methods of 
behavioural economics to diagnose problems and pre-test remedies can make for more 
evidence-informed policy. 
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